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Reds Not Ready to Fight Over Berlin Central Intelligence Agency Believes

CPYRGHT
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Will Soviet Russia explode the Berlin crisis into World War III?

The hush-hush Central Intelligence Agency is reasonably sure it has the answer to that question, and the answer, apparently, is a cautious no.

Robert Amory Jr., CIA deputy director for intelligence, says the Russians "haven't got what it takes rationally to challenge us this spring."

Although the Soviet Union is not ready to risk a major nuclear war over Berlin, he says, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev "expects to force us to chicken out."

"If the West is resolute, then I believe that the Soviet Union, by hook or crook, will be the one to back down."

The CIA deputy further declared Soviet leaders were told 18 months ago that a 15-year period of peace is imperative.

"Their economy is by no means mobilized for war or preparing for war," Amory says.

Amory hedges his bet on the Kremlin's reluctance to pull the trigger, to this extent: The Soviets, he says, though not ready, will fight if circumstances force a war.

Amory made his unusual on-the-record appraisal of Soviet intentions in a recent, little-publicized lecture at the University of South Carolina. It was his first public address in four years.

Whether his statement reflects the CIA's official view as laid before President Eisenhower and the policy-shaping National Security Council, is a matter of conjecture. The CIA rarely makes public utterances on international affairs.

At any hour of the day or night, the CIA can and often does come up with crash estimates of the situation wherever a crisis develops. These include such things as reports on the movement of important military units and coldly logical appraisals of what is likely to happen.

It is this round-the-clock alertness, in contrast to haphazard methods used in the past, that the CIA confidently expects to prevent the disaster of another Pearl Harbor.

The agency, for example, accurately predicted that the Russians wouldn't fight when President Truman ordered the Berlin airlift in June 1948.

And though it has never said so publicly, there is reason to believe the CIA estimated Russia might have resorted to war if the United States had intervened in the 1956 Hungarian revolution.

Behind these all-important appraisals is a staid, chair-borne staff of global information experts whose job at times overshadows the exploits of clandestine espionage agents.

The CIA maintains a sizable force of economic specialists, scientists, translators, linguists, geophysicists, cartographers, physicists and others to gather, analyze and interpret the enormous flood of information pouring in from every corner of the world—foreign radio broadcasts, magazines, newspapers, wire service reports, etc.

As a single example, the CIA translates all obtainable Soviet scientific publications, a herculean task since the Russians publish as much scientific data as we do. The CIA translations, in turn, are published by the Department of Commerce and sold to the public at 12¢ for a year's subscription.

Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff, author of "Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age," says he believes a close study of Soviet periodicals, newspapers, books and manuals can provide a jackpot of vital information.

"Although published statements can be falsified and deceptive," Garthoff says, "the writings in Soviet military journals on doctrinal and strategic views have proved remarkably accurate."

It follows that the Russians also use American publications in their intelligence work.

Concerning this CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, makes no secret of his belief that "we tell the Russians too much."

It is known, for example, that the Russian Embassy and Soviet agents in this country ship literally tons of U.S. military information to the Kremlin.

It is little wonder that a recent issue of the Soviet army magazine Voennyi Vestnik, Military Herald, carried a description of the U.S. Army's new battlefield surveillance system, I. E., using television cameras to bring the battlefield directly before the eyes of top commanders.

The Soviet officer who wrote the article obviously extracted most of his material from U.S. Army publications.